Instantie
VN Comite rechten van de mens
Samenvatting
Klaagster was werkloos van 1 februari 1983 tot 24 april 1984. Op 11
december 1986 vroeg zij WWV aan, die werd afgewezen omdat zij ten tijde
van de aanvraag niet werkloos was. Deze eis is volgens het VN Comite
redelijk en objectief. De vraag of en vanaf wanneer het BuPo-verdrag
rechtstreekse werking heeft, is een zaak van nationaal recht. Dit valt
niet onder de competentie van het VN Comite.
Volledige tekst
The facts as submitted by the author:
1. The author of the communication is Mrs. C., a citizen of the
Netherlands, residing at Diemen, the Netherlands. She claims to be a
victim of a violation by the Netherlands of article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. She is represented
by counsel.
2.1. The author was born in 1939, and is married to Mr. C. From September
1979 to January 1983 she was employed as a part-time secretary for 20
hours a week. As of 1 February 1983 she was unemployed. In virtue of the
WW (Unemployment Act) she was granted for the maximum period of six months
(until 1 August 1983). The author subsequently found new employment, as
of 24 April 1984.
2.2. Having received WW benefits for the maximum period, the author, as
an unemployed person in 1983-84, contends that she was entitled to
benefits under the then WWV (Unemployment Provision Act), for a maximum
period of two years. These benefits amounted to 75 percent of the last
salary, whereas the WW benefits amounted to eighty percent of the last
salary.
2.3. The author, on 11 December 1986, applied for WWV benefits to the
Municipality of Leusden, her then place of residence, Her application was
rejected on 8 April 1987 on the grounds that, as a married woman who did
not qualify as a breadwinner, she did not meet the requirements of the
Act. The rejection was based on article 13, paragraph 1, subsection 1,
WWV, which did not apply to married men.
2.4. On 2 July 1987, the Municipality confirmed its earlier decision. The
author subsequently appealed to the Board of Appeal at Utrecht which, by
decision of 22 February 1988, declared her appeal to be well-founded; the
decision of 8 April 1987 was set aside.
2.5. The Munipality then appealed to the Central Board of Appeal which,
by judgment of 10 may 1989, confirmed the Munipality’s earlier decisions
and set aside the Board of Appeal’s decision. The author claims she has
exhausted all available domestic remedies.
The complaint:
3.1. In the author’s opinion, the denial of WWV benefits amounts to
discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the Covenant. She
refers to the Views of the Human Rights Commitee regarding communications
No. 172/1984 (Broeks v. the Netherlands) and No. 182/1984 (Zwaan-de Vries
v. the Netherlands).
3.2. In its judgment of 10 May 1989, the Central Board of Appeal concedes,
as in earlier judgments, that article 26 in conjunction with article 2 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies also to
the granting of social security benefits and similar entitlements. The
Central Board further observed that the explicit exclusion of married
women, unless they meet specific requirements that are not applicable to
married men, implies direct discrimination on the ground of sex in
relation to (marital) status. However, the Central Board held “that as far
as the elimination of discrimination in the sphere of national social
security legislation is concerned, in some situations there is room for
a gradual implementation with regard to the moment at which unequal
treatment … cannot be considered acceptable any longer, as well as in
view of the question when in such a case the moment has come at which
article 26 of the Covenant in relation to national legislation cannot be
denied direct applicability any longer”. The Central Board concluded in
relation to the provision in the WWV that article 26 of the Covenant could
not be denied direct applicability after 23 December 1984, the time-limit
established by the Third Directive of the European Economic Community
(EEC) regarding the elimination of discrimination between men and women
within the Community.
3.3. The author notes that the Covenant entered into force for the
Netherlands on 11 March 1979, and that, accordingly, article 26 was
directly applicable as of that date. She contends that the date of 23
December 1984 was chosen arbitrarily, as there is no formal link between
the Covenant and the Third EEC Directive. The Central Board had not, in
earlier judgments, taken a consistent view with regard to the direct
applicability of article 26. In a case relating to the General Disabelment
Act (AAW), for instance, the Central Board decided that article 26 could
not be denied direct applicability after 1 January 1980.
3.4. The author submits that the Netherlands had, when ratifying the
Covenant, accepted the direct applicability of its provisions, in
accordance with article 93 and 94 of the constitution. Furthermore, even
if a gradual elimination of discrimination were permissible under the
Covenant. Furthermore, even if a gradual elimination of discrimination
were permissible under the Covenant, the transitional period of almost 13
years between the adoption of the Covenant in 1966 and its entry into
force for the Netherlands in 1979, was sufficient to enable it to adapt
its legislation accordingly.
3.5. The author claims she suffered damage as a result of the application
of the discriminatory provisions in WWV, in that WWV benefits were refused
to her for the period of 1 August 1983 to 24 April 1984. She contends that
these benefits should be granted to women equally as to men as of 11 March
1979 (the date the Covenant entered into force for the Netherlands), in
her case os of 1 August 1983, notwithstanding measures adopted by the
Government to grant married women WWV benefits equally after 23 December
1984.
The Committee’s admissibility decision:
4.1. During its 44ht session the Commitee considered the admissibility of
ht communication. It noted that the State party, by submission of 11
December 1990, raised no objections against admissibility and conceded
that the author had exhausted available remedies.
4.2. On 20 March 1992, the Commitee declared the communication admissible
inasmuch as it might raise issues under article 26 of the Covenant.
State party’s submission on the merits and tuhor’s comments:
5.1. By submission of 8 December 1992, the State party argues that the
autor’s communication is unsubtantiated, since the facts of the case do
not reveal a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.
5.2. The State party submits that article 13, paragraph 1, subsection 1,
WWV, on which the rejection of the unemployment benefit of the author was
based, was abrogated by law of 24 Arpil 1985. In his law, however, it was
laid down that the law which was in force to that date -including the
controversial article 13, paragraph 1, subsection 1- remained applicable
in respect of married women who had become unemployed before 23 December
1984. As these transitionary provisions were much criticized, they were
abolished by Act of 6 June 1991. As a result, women who had been
ineligible in the past to claim WWV benefits because of the breadwinner
criterion, can claim these benefits retroactively, provided they satisfy
the other requirements of the Act. One of the other requirements is that
the applicant be unemployed on the date of application.
5.3. The State party therefore contends that, if the author had been
unemployed on the date of application for the WWV benefit, she would be
eligible to retroactive benefits on the basis of her unemployed status as
from 1 February 1983. However since the author had found other umployment
as of April 1984, she could not claim retroactive benefits under the WWV.
The State party emphasizes that since the amendment of the law on 6 June
1991 the obstacle to the author’s eligibility for a benefit is not the
breadwinner criterion, but her failure to satisfy the other requirements
under the law that apply to all, men and women alike.
5.4. The State party that, by amending the law in this respect, it has
complied with the principle of equality before the law as laid down in
article 26 of the Covenant.
5.5. Moreover, the State party reiterates the observations it made in
connection with communications Nos. 172/1984 (Broeks v. the Netherlands,
Views adopted on 9 April 1987) and 182/1984 (Zwaan-de Vries v. the
Netherlands, Views adopted on 9 April 1987). It emphasizes that the intent
of the breadwinner criterion in the WWV was not to discriminate between
married men and married women, but rather to reflect a fact of life,
namely that men generally were breadwinners whereas women were not. The
State party argues therefore that the law did not violate article 26 of
the convenant, since objective and reasonable grounds existed at the time
to justify the differentiation in treatment between married men and
married women.
5.6. Furthermore, the State party argues that the implementation of equal
rights in national legislation depends on the nature of the subject matter
to which the principle of equality must be applied. The State party
contends that, in the field of social security, differentiation is
necessary to bring about social justice. The incorporation of the
breadwinner criterion in the WWV should be seen in this light, as its
object was to limit the eligibility of the benefit to those who were
breadwinners. In this context, the State party refers to the individual
opinion (Appended by Messers. Nisuke Ando, Kurt Hemdl and Briame Ndiaye)
appended to the Committee’s Views in communication No. 395/1990″, which
states that “article 26 of the Covenant shoul not be interpreted as
requiring absolute equality or nondiscrimination in the field of social
security at all times; instead it should be seen as a general undertaking
on the part of States parties to the Covenant to regularly review their
legislation in order to ensure that it corresponds to the changing needs
of society”.
5.7. In this connection, the State party submits that it regularly adjusts
its social security legislation to accommodate shifts in the prevailing
social climate and/or structure, as it had done in the WWV. The State
party concludes that by amending the WWV in 1991, it has complied with its
obligations under article 26 and article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the
Covenant.
6.1. By submission of 8 March 1993, consel stresses that the central issue
in the comunication is whether article 26 of the Covenant had acquired
direct effect before 23 December 1984, more specifically on 1 August 1983.
She argues that the explicit exclusion of married women from benefits
under the WWV constitutes a dsicrimination on the grounds of sex in
relation to marital status. counsel argues that, even if obejctive and
reasonable grounds existed tot justify the differentiation in treatment
between married men and married women at the time of the enactment of the
provision, conditions in society no longer suported such differentiation
in August 1983.
6.2. Counsel submits that, under the amended law, it is still not possible
for the author, who has found new employment, to claim the benefits she
was denied before. In this connection, she points out that the author
failed to apply for a benefit during the period of her unemployment
because the law at that time did not grant her any right to a benefit
under the WWV. The author applied or a benefit after the breadwinner-
requirement for women was dropped as from 23 December 1984, but had by
then found new employment. She therefore argues that the disciminatory
effect of the said provision of WWV is not abolished for her, but still
continues.
6.3. Counsel refers to the Committee’s Vieuws in communications Nos.
172/1984 (Broeks v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 9 April 1987) and
182/1984 (Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 9 April
1987) and argues that, even if a transitional period is acceptable to
bring the law in compliance with the Covenant, the lenght of that period,
from the entry into force of the Covenant (11 March 1979) to the amendment
of the law (6 June 1991), is unreasonoble. Counsel therefore maintains
that article 26 of the Covenant has been violated in the author’s case by
the refusal of the State party to grant her a WWV benefit for the period
of her unemployment, from a August 1983 to 24 April 1984.
Examination of the merits: Samenvatting van de overwegingen:
7.1. Het Comite voor de Rechten van de Mens heeft de onderhavige klacht
bezien in het licht van alle informatie die partijen hebben verstrekt.
7.2. Het Comite staat voor de beantwoording van de vraag of de klaagster
een slachtoffer is van een schending van artikel 26 van het BuPo-verdrag
(a) omdat de stand en de toepassing van de wet in augustus 1983 haar geen
aanspraak gaf op een uitkering ingevolge de WWV, en (b) omdat de huidige
toepassing van de gewijzigde wet haar nog steeds geen aanspraak geeft op
een uitkering over de periode van haar werkloosheid van 1 augustus 1983
tot 24 april 1984. In dit verband heeft klaagster het Comite ook verzocht
te bepalen dat het BuPo- verdrag in Nederland rechtstreekse werking
verkreeg met ingang van 11 maart 1979 of in elk geval met ingang van 1
augustus 1983.
7.3. Het Comite herinnert aan zijn voorgaande uitspraken en merkt op dat
een Staat weliswaar ingevolge het BuPo-verdrag niet verplicht is sociale
zekerheidswetgeving aan te nemen, maar dat, als de Staat dergelijke
wetgeving aanneemt, deze in overeenstemming moet zijn met artikel 26 van
het BuPo-verdrag.
7.4. Het Comite merkt op dat zo de in 1983 geldende wet al niet strookte
met de vereisten van artikel 26 van het BuPo- verdrag, deze tekortkoming
is gecorrigeerd door de wijziging van de wet met terugwerkende kracht bij
de wet van 6 juni 1991. Klaagster heeft aangevoerd dat de gewijzigde wet
nog steeds een indirecte discriminatie ten opzichte van haar inhoudt,
omdat deze de voorwaarde stelt dat degenen die een uitkering aanvragen,
werkloos zijn ten tijde van de aanvraag en dat deze voorwaarde eraan in
de weg staat dat zij met terugwerkende kracht aanspraak kan maken op de
uitkering. Het Comite is van oordeel dat de voorwaarde dat de aanvrager
ten tijde van de aanvraag voor een uitkering werkloos is, als zodanig
redelijk en objectief is, gelet op de doelstellingen van de betrokken wet,
namelijk om werklozen een uitkering te verschaffen. Het Comite komt daarom
tot de slotsom dat de feiten, zoals die aan het Comite zijn voorgelegd,
geen blijk geven van een schending van artikel 26 van het BuPo-verdrag.
7.5. Wat betreft het verzoek van klaagster aan het Comite om uit te
spreken dat artikel 26 van het BuPo-verdrag in Nederland rechtstreekse
werking heeft verkregen per 11 maart 1979, zijnde de datum waarop het
BuPo-verdrag voor de Staat der Nederlanden in werking is getreden, dan wel
in ieder geval per 1 augustus 1983, overweegt het Comite dat de wijze
waarop de bepalingen van het BuPo-verdrag in de nationale wetgeving en
praktijk worden opgenomen, verschillend is naar gelang de verschillende
rechtssystemen. De beantwoording van de vraag of en wanneer artikel 26
rechtstreekse werking heeft verkregen in Nederland is daarom een kwestie
van nationaal recht. Het Comite is niet bevoegd daarover een uitspraak te
doen.
8. Het Comite voor de Rechten van de Mens is van oordeel dat de feiten,
zoals die aan het Comite zijn voorgelegd, geen blijk geven van een
schending van enige bepaling van het BuPo- verdrag.